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In re StEVEn J. LEVEr
 Which is more important: protecting minors from sexual predators or protecting 
client funds from theft? the answer seems obvious, but inconsistencies in the 
respective sanctions imposed on attorneys who commit these crimes imply otherwise.1 
attorneys who engage in dishonest or criminal acts that violate their clients’ trust 
have been publicly met with the strictest sanctions.2 But attorneys who violate the 
public’s trust by engaging in socially deviant behavior, such as actual or attempted sex 
with minors, have been sanctioned quietly and their sanctions have been inconsistent 
in severity. What is the appropriate sanction for an attorney convicted of such crimes? 
and, more specifically, does an attorney deserve “the privilege of admission to the bar 
and the elevated status of . . . officer of the court” if he intended to have sex with a 
minor but did not do so only because he was the subject of a police investigation?3 the 
new York code of professional responsibility (the “code”) instructs that “an attorney 
shall not engage in illegal or any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.”4 But because the code does not provide a clear 
definition of “fitness,”5 sanctions vary greatly from case to case.6
 in In re Lever, the appellate Division, First Department, held that the appropriate 
sanction for an attorney convicted of an attempted criminal sex act in the third 
degree with a minor was suspension of his license to practice law for the longer of 
three years or his criminal probationary period.7 the First Department agreed with 
the hearing panel that Lever had engaged in conduct that reflected poorly on all 
attorneys in general, and new York attorneys in particular.8 But based on mitigating 
1. For example, the outcomes in new York for such crimes range from short-term suspensions to 
disbarment. See infra discussions of In re Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d 523 (1st Dep’t 2008) (catterson, J., 
dissenting); In re Singer, 738 n.Y.S.2d 38 (1st Dep’t 2002); In re harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d 645 (3rd Dep’t 
2001); and In re Wong, 710 n.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep’t 2000).
2. most notably, in recent years the enrOn scandal represents perhaps the most highly publicized such 
situation. See richard acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat: Bankruptcy Examination Outlines Possible 
Causes of Action, aBa Journal, June 2004, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/enron_
lawyers_in_the_hot_seat/. 
3. See Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 530 (catterson, J., dissenting). By design, the model rules of professional 
responsibility provide a minimum standard that attorneys must meet, but the rules neither specifically 
define all terms nor mandate specific sanctions. See generally n.Y. rules of prof’l responsibility 
(2010)
4. n.Y. State Bar ass’n. Lawyer’s code of prof’l responsibility Dr 1-102(a)(3), (7) (2007), 
incorporated into n.Y. rules of prof’l responsibility r. 8.4(b), (h) (emphasis added). effective april 1, 
2009, the new York State Bar association adopted the model rules of professional conduct numbering 
system. hereinafter, all references to the new York State Bar association Lawyers code of professional 
responsibility will contain a parallel citation to the new new York rules of professional responsibility. 
5. although the term “fitness” appears in rules 8.3 and 8.4, it is not specifically defined in either, nor in 
rule 1.0, which sets forth definitions of relevant terminology. See n.Y. rules of prof’l responsibility 
r. 1.0, 8.3, 8.4.
6. See infra discussions of Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 530 (catterson, J., dissenting); Singer, 738 n.Y.S.2d at 39; 
Harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d at 645; and Wong, 710 n.Y.S.2d at 57.
7. 869 n.Y.S.2d at 524, 529.
8. Id. at 529.
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factors surrounding the crime, in particular, the lack of any actual sexual contact 
between Lever and the minor,9 disbarment was not the appropriate sanction.10 this 
case comment contends that the court missed an opportunity to send a clear message 
to both the new York State Bar and the public that a registered sex offender is not fit 
to practice. the court’s application of an “actual sexual contact” test, whereby 
disbarment is appropriate only if the individual engages in actual sexual contact with 
a minor, is f lawed. Specifically, the court should have followed the dissent’s reasoning 
and applied a test for fitness based on the nature of the crime committed and 
disbarred Lever because of his conviction and registration as a sex offender.
 in July 2004 Lever entered an internet chat room designed to allow older men 
and younger women to connect.11 at the time, he was a thirty-year-old associate in 
the patent department of a new York city law firm.12 For three months, Lever 
engaged in several “sexually explicit conversations” with a person he believed to be a 
thirteen-year-old girl.13 in October 2004 he arranged to meet the “girl” at a train 
station for the purpose of engaging in an “oral sexual act.”14 But when he arrived, 
Lever learned that he had actually been communicating with an undercover police 
officer, and was arrested.15 he was charged with six counts of disseminating indecent 
material to a minor in the first degree, a felony, and with attempted criminal sexual 
act in the third degree, a misdemeanor.16 in September 2005 Lever pled guilty to an 
attempted criminal sex act in the third degree; he was later sentenced to six years’ 
probation and required to register as a level-one sexual offender.17
 as a result of his conviction, the First Department Disciplinary committee18 
“served [Lever] with a notice and statement of charges alleging that he engaged in 
illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
9. Id. at 524–25.
10. Id. at 524.
11. Id. at 530. a chat room is a “real-time online interactive discussion group.” Chat Room Definition, 
merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chat%20room (last visited Jan. 
10, 2011).
12. Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 530.
13. Id. 
14. Id. according to the record, Lever planned to meet the “girl” at a Long island train station, approximately 
ninety minutes from new York city’s pennsylvania Station. Id.
15. Id. 
16. Id.
17. Id. Lever was also ordered to participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program, 
which carried with it over $1200 in fees. Id. 
18. the First Department Disciplinary committee
is charged with the day-to-day administration of the attorney Disciplinary System for 
the more than 55,000 lawyers who work in manhattan and the Bronx . . . . [the 
committee] handles approximately 3,500 complaints against First Department lawyers 
annually. . . . if, after a full due process hearing, charges are sustained, the case is filed 
with the court for a final determination as to whether discipline should be imposed.
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lawyer.”19 a disciplinary hearing ensued. Because of the mitigating evidence presented 
by Lever and the fact that there was “no actual sexual contact with a minor,” the 
referee presiding over the resulting disciplinary hearing recommended a six-month 
suspension of his law license.20 But the hearing panel considering Lever’s appeal of 
that decision found the referee’s recommendation of a six-month suspension too 
lenient,21 and instead recommended that the suspension last for the longer of three 
years or the duration of his criminal probation.22 the panel felt that using the internet 
to “prey on minors” should carry a harsher sentence that would “send a strong message 
to both the bar and public that sexual misconduct involving minors will be met with 
a significant sanction.”23
 treating this case as one of first impression,24 the First Department held that the 
panel’s recommendation was proper.25 relying on Attorney Grievance Commission of 
Maryland v. Childress26 and Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Engl,27 the court held that 
because Lever’s actions did not involve any sexual contact, he should not be 
disbarred.28 Despite consideration of the serious “nature and severity of respondent’s 
offense,”29 the First Department concluded that disbarment was not appropriate 
because of the significant mitigating circumstances.30 Specifically, the court 
considered that: Lever committed the crime at a time when he was under extreme 
personal and professional stress; he later accepted responsibility for his actions and 
showed remorse; and, most importantly, there was a complete lack of actual sexual 
 Character and Fitness, n.Y. St. Sup. ct. app. Div. First Dep’t, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad1/
centennial/disciplinary.shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
19. Lever received this notice in november 2006. Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 524. in addition, the committee 
charged Lever with engaging “in conduct that adversely ref lected on his fitness as a lawyer.” Id.
20. Id. at 524–25.
21. Id. at 525.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 525–26. this case comment questions whether a three-year suspension will send such a message 
to the public. While the majority believes that a “registered sex offender” remains fit to practice, i 
suspect his clients may feel otherwise.
24. Id. at 526. the majority agreed with the dissent that there were no new York disciplinary cases “directly 
on point”; therefore, the court had to rely on the “most analogous precedents [in new York] and other 
jurisdictions.” Id.
25. Id. at 528–29.
26. attorney Grievance comm’n of md. v. childress (Childress II), 770 a.2d 685 (md. 2001).
27. Office of Lawyer regulation v. engl (Engl), 698 n.W.2d 821 (Wis. 2005).
28. Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 528–29.
29. Id. at 528. 
30. Id. at 529. the majority opinion stated that “even if we agreed with the dissent that the offense, by itself, 
would ordinarily require disbarment, the substantial and credible mitigation evidence offered by 
respondent in this case requires us to consider a lesser sanction.” Id. it went on to express that “[i]n 
urging disbarment as the only appropriate sanction in this case, the dissent relies on factually 
distinguishable cases which involved an attorney’s actual sexual contact with a minor.” Id. at 527.
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contact between Lever and the minor.31 the dissent disagreed, however, arguing 
that conviction and registration as a sex offender “merits disbarment, even when the 
crime, as in the [case of Lever’s], is inchoate.”32
 the Lever court’s balancing of the nature of the act with mitigating circumstances 
was influenced by the Childress court’s treatment of similar facts and circumstances.33 
James childress was admitted to the maryland and District of columbia bars in 
1989.34 From 1993 to 1995 childress engaged in sexually explicit conversations with 
underage girls via internet chat rooms and met on several occasions with girls who 
were generally between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.35 While these meetings 
apparently did not involve sexual contact, childress presented sex as the reason for 
the meetings.36 During his conversation with an undercover police officer posing as a 
fourteen-year-old girl, childress described in “lurid detail the sexual activity in 
which he desired to engage” with her.37 childress was subsequently arrested and 
convicted in the U.S. District court for the District of maryland, Southern Division, 
in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 2423(b): travelling interstate with “intent to engage in a 
sexual act with a minor.”38 childress was also charged in maryland state court with 
violating maryland rule of professional conduct 8.4(d), which prohibits an attorney 
from “engaging ‘in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’”39 as 
a result of his conviction in federal court, the maryland court of appeals held that 
although the respondent engaged in sexually explicit chat room conversations with 
several young girls over the course of three years, he should not be disbarred because 
of mitigating factors, including that “childress did not sexually touch the victims 
involved.”40 the court instead suspended childress from the practice of law 
indefinitely, without the opportunity to apply for cancellation of the suspension for 
one year.41 after the one-year period, childress’s reinstatement would be dependent 
31. Id. at 524–25, 529. 
32. Id. at 533 (catterson, J., dissenting). 
33. Id. at 527 (“[W]e agree with the maryland court’s willingness to at least examine the facts underlying 
the crimes, as well as the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, before deciding on an appropriate 
sanction.”).
34. attorney Grievance comm’n of md. v. childress (Childress I), 758 a.2d 117, 118 (md. 2000).
35. Childress II, 770 a.2d 685, 688 (md. 2001) (quoting Childress I, 758 a.2d at 119).
36. Id.
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 687. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 695–96.
41. Id. at 696. Because childress’s crime involved interstate travel, he was convicted of a federal crime. he 
was then charged with violating maryland’s rules of professional conduct. the circuit court for 
prince George’s county in maryland determined that he had “engag[ed] in conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice” by using internet to solicit sex with young teenage girls. See id. at 687–89 
(internal quotation marks omitted). childress filed exceptions, and the maryland court of appeals 
remanded; on remand, the circuit court reversed his conviction due to a “drafting error in 18 U.S.c. 
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upon a satisfactory psychological evaluation of his mental state at the time of the 
application and an explanation of all psychiatric treatment he received.42
 the Lever majority also relied on Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Engl to support 
its sanction of Lever through suspension rather than disbarment.43 Joseph engl, like 
Lever, was a young attorney who was the focus of a police undercover operation.44 in 
april 2004 engl entered a chat room and engaged in a conversation with someone 
he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl.45 after expressing interest in having sex 
with the girl, he arranged to meet her later that evening.46 in reality, engl had 
propositioned a police detective posing as a fourteen-year-old girl, and he was arrested 
when he arrived at the meeting location.47 he pled guilty to the charge of using a 
computer to commit a child sex crime, a class D felony in Wisconsin, and was 
sentenced to four years’ probation.48 the Supreme court of Wisconsin held that, in 
light of the mitigating circumstances, the appropriate sanction was a public 
reprimand.49 the court also required engl to undergo a psychological evaluation and 
sex offender treatment, and limited both his exposure to children and his use of 
computers—but his license was not suspended.50
 in both Childress and Engl, the respective courts acknowledged that preying on 
children via the internet for purposes of sex is particularly damaging to the legal 
profession and warrants severe sanctions.51 But in each case the sanctions were 
reduced in light of the remorse shown by the attorneys, their participation in a 
psychological treatment program, and the lack of previous disciplinary actions against 
them.52 relying on the outcomes in these cases, the Lever court held that, especially 
where mitigating circumstances exist, “misdemeanor convictions involving sexual 
solicitation” usually result in suspension, not disbarment. therefore, Lever’s 
§2423(b),” but the reversal was based on “technical grounds unrelated to the facts of the case.” Id. at 687. 
Upon retrial (Childress II), the maryland court of appeals suspended childress from the practice of law 
in maryland indefinitely and without the right to reapply for one year. Id. at 696–97.
42. Id. at 696–97. 
43. Engl, 698 n.W.2d 821, 822–23 (Wis. 2005).
44. In re Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (1st Dep’t 2008).




49. Id. at 823.
50. Id. engl was placed on four years’ probation with “conditions that he undergo counseling and evaluation 
for sex offender treatment; that he have no unsupervised contact with females under the age of 18 except 
for relatives; that he not visit chat rooms or sexual websites; that he not engage in instant messaging; 
that he submit a Dna sample; and that he not possess firearms.” Id. 
51. Childress II, 770 a.2d 685, 695 (md. 2001); Engl, 698 n.W.2d at 822. 
52. Childress II, 770 a.2d at 695–96; Engl, 698 n.W.2d at 822–23.
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suspension was appropriate.53 Specifically, the court pointed to Lever’s remorse, his 
participation in therapy, and his lack of a prior disciplinary record.54 however, 
Childress is distinguishable from Lever in that childress apparently did not intend to 
have sex with the minors, whereas Lever admitted that his intention was to engage in 
a sexual act with the thirteen-year-old girl.55
 in the dissenting opinion in Lever, Justices catterson and Saxe contended,56 as 
does this case comment, that disbarment is the only appropriate sanction for an 
attorney who is convicted of a sex crime related to a minor.57 the dissent agreed with 
the majority that no new York decision was exactly on point, however Justice 
catterson identified two cases that were “strikingly similar” and supported disbarring 
Lever.58 in In re Harlow, the appellate Division, third Department, disbarred the 
respondent, without comment, based on his felony conviction for “injury or risk of 
injury to, or impairing the morals of, children” in connecticut.59 and in In re Singer, 
the First Department rejected the Disciplinary committee’s recommendation to 
suspend Singer, and chose instead to disbar him based on the nature of the crime 
and the aggravating circumstances surrounding his conviction in Virginia of 
aggravated sexual battery.60 in both of these cases, the respective court focused on 
the “nature of the offense” in conjunction with the mitigating factors involved and 
found that disbarment was appropriate.61
 in support of disbarring Lever, the dissent cited Harlow, the facts of which are 
virtually identical to Lever with one exception: harlow was not conversing over the 
53. In re Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d 523, 528–29 (1st Dep’t 2008).
54. Id. at 529. in all three cases, the court considered mitigating evidence that the attorneys were remorseful, 
attending therapy, and had no prior disciplinary records. in addition, each had recently endured a 
personal “tragedy” such as the loss of a parent, grandparent, or the end of a relationship. this implies 
that dealing with such a trauma while under serious professional stress is a justification for preying on 
juveniles for sex. if this is the case, one would expect many more cases such as this one among attorneys 
and others in high-pressure careers.
55. Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 532; Childress II, 770 a.2d at 691.
56. Justice James m. catterson and Justice David B. Saxe dissented in the opinion written by Justice 
catterson.
57. Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 531 (“i do not believe that we can reconcile the status of registered sex offender 
with that of a member of the bar in good standing.”).
58. Id. at 532. the dissent discusses two reciprocal disciplinary cases as relevant but not controlling. See In 
re maiorino, 750 n.Y.S.2d 264 (1st Dep’t 2002) (attorney convicted in connecticut of improper touching 
of minor and publicly reprimanded in new Jersey and new York); In re Wong, 710 n.Y.S.2d 57 (1st 
Dep’t 2000) (attorney publicly reprimanded in new York for sexual contact with minor that occurred in 
new Jersey two years before he was admitted to the bar in both new York and new Jersey). a third 
case, In re Cunningham, 841 n.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep’t 2007), was also cited by the Lever court to support 
the premise that the court has accepted the resignation of an attorney convicted for corresponding with 
a minor via the internet where the content of the exchanges included sexual content.
59. 720 n.Y.S.2d 645 (3rd Dep’t 2001).
60. 738 n.Y.S.2d 38, 39–40 (1st Dep’t 2002).
61. Id. at 40; Harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d at 645 (“in view of respondent’s conviction of a serious crime . . . .”).
930
In re StEVEn J. LEVEr
internet with an undercover police officer.62 instead, he was corresponding with an 
actual thirteen-year-old girl and engaged in sexual relations with her. harlow was 
subsequently convicted in connecticut of the felony of injury or risk of injury to, or 
impairing the morals of, a child.63 the connecticut court sentenced harlow to ten 
years’ probation and suspended him from practice.64 in a one-page decision, the 
third Department simply stated that, “under the circumstances presented, we 
conclude that respondent should be disbarred.”65
 in Singer, the attorney pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of aggravated 
sexual battery in Virginia, a felony in Virginia but a class a misdemeanor in new 
York.66 the First Department disagreed with the Disciplinary committee’s 
recommendation of a five-year suspension with application for reinstatement 
predicated on Singer being “independently evaluated by a therapist attesting to his 
continued rehabilitation and abstinence from any illegal conduct,”67 and his 
commitment to ongoing treatment.68 the court held that disbarment was the 
appropriate sanction “[b]ased upon the disturbing nature of the crime and the 
aggravating factors,”69 as well as the fact that Harlow was controlling.70




66. In re Singer, 738 n.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1st Dep’t 2002). the specific facts of the criminal case are unreported. 
in Virginia, one is guilty of aggravated sexually battery when
he or she sexually abuses the complaining witness, and 1. the complaining witness is 
less than 13 years of age, or; 2. the act is accomplished through the use of the 
complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical helplessness, or; 3. the offense is 
committed by a parent, step-parent, grandparent, or step-grandparent and the 
complaining witness is at least 13 but less than 18 years of age, or; 4. the act is 
accomplished against the will of the complaining witness by force, threat or intimidation, 
and: a. the complaining witness is at least 13 but less than 15 years of age, or;  b. the 
accused causes serious bodily or mental injury to the complaining witness, or; c. the 
accused uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.
 B. aggravated sexual battery is a felony punishable by confinement in a state 
correctional facility for a term of not less than one nor more than 20 years and by a fine 
of not more than $100,000.
 Va. code ann. § 18.2-67.3(a), (B) (2010). Because the court states that there was no “forcible conduct 
involved” in Singer’s actions, subsection (a)(4) does not apply. Id. § (a)(4); Singer, 738 n.Y.S.2d at 39. 
therefore, Singer’s crime would have had to involve the sexual abuse of a child under thirteen, who may 
or may not have been mentally or physically helpless, or who was related to him in some way. See Singer, 
738 n.Y.S.2d at 39.
67. Singer, 738 n.Y.S.2d at 39. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 40. 
70. Id. among these aggravating factors, the court cited the nature of the sentence imposed by the Virginia 
court, Singer’s admission that his crime exhibited “moral turpitude,” Singer’s admission that he had 
engaged in similar conduct with other children over a ten-year period, a lack of letters attesting to his 
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 according to the dissent in Lever, the test for disbarment should be conviction 
and registration as a sex offender.71 in distinguishing Lever from both Singer and 
harlow, the Lever majority held that in the absence of actual sexual contact, 
disbarment was not appropriate.72 the dissent argued, however, that a test for 
disbarment based on actual sexual contact was insufficient to protect the courts and 
public from an attorney who is unfit to practice.73 an attorney who intends to engage 
in a sexual act with a minor, and does not do so only because of police intervention, 
is still a danger to the public. the majority distinguished Lever from harlow because 
Lever was convicted of attempted sexual contact, but harlow was convicted of actual 
sexual contact.74 While this distinction is often determinative of the charges brought 
and at sentencing in criminal proceedings, it is not necessary to determine the fitness 
of an individual to practice law, nor is it a standard that the court must adhere to in 
a disciplinary proceeding.75
 an attorney’s fitness is based on his honesty, uprightness, and trustworthiness as 
evidenced by his actions and behavior.76 it is the court’s “duty, since attorneys are its 
officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the 
transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.”77 Both 
harlow and Lever engaged in long-term efforts to solicit a minor (Lever believed 
that he was corresponding with and meeting a thirteen-year-old girl), and both 
intended to engage in a sexual act with a minor.78 the facts of Harlow are identical 
to Lever except that: (1) harlow engaged in verbal and physical sexual contact; and 
(2) harlow was in contact with a thirteen-year-old girl, not a police detective.79 the 
fact that one was the object of a police undercover operation while the other was not 
is irrelevant to a proper determination of the attorney’s fitness to practice law. the 
purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public from an attorney who 
good character, the court’s disbelief that five years of treatment would change his behavior, and the fact 
that his behavior severely undermined the public’s trust in the profession. Id. 
71. See In re Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d 523, 533 (1st Dep’t 2008) (catterson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 524–25.
73. Id. at 533 (catterson, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. at 527. in addition, the court distinguished Harlow based on the lack of mitigating evidence in favor 
of harlow, reasoning that harlow was, unlike Lever, not deserving of any leniency. Id.
75. the court’s responsibility in disciplinary hearings is to review the recommendation of the referee in 
order to determine the attorney’s fitness to practice. See n.Y. State Bar ass’n Lawyer’s code of 
prof’l responsibility, preliminary Statement (2007). “Disciplinary proceedings are not for the 
purpose of punishment, but rather seek to determine the fitness of an officer of the court to continue in 
that capacity and to protect the courts and the public from the official ministration of persons unfit to 
practice.” In re Wong, 710 n.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (1st Dep’t 2000) (quoting Office of Disciplinary counsel v. 
Zdrok, 645 a.2d 830, 834 (pa. 1994)).
76. See code of prof’l responsibility Dr 1-102; n.Y. rules of prof’l conduct r. 8.4.
77. Childress II, 770 a.2d 685, 695 (md. 2001) (quoting md. State Bar ass’n v. agnew, 318 a.2d 811, 814 
(md. 1974)).
78. See Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 524; In re harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d 645 (3d Dep’t 2001).
79. See Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 523; Harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d at 645.
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uses his position to prey upon the weak and impressionable. and when the intent to 
harm a minor is clear, culmination of the intended harmful act is irrelevant to a 
determination of fitness.
 the Lever case illustrates that current case law is inconsistent and lacks a clear 
test for disbarment in cases where attorneys prey on minors for sex. By applying an 
“actual sexual contact” test to determine whether Lever should have been disbarred,80 
the majority missed a significant opportunity to send a clear message to members of 
the new York State Bar and the public that a convicted, registered sex offender is not 
fit to practice law. instead, the court’s decision implies that an attorney may prey on 
minors via the internet for sex and, so long as there is no “actual sexual contact,”81 he 
will not be disbarred. application of the dissent’s “conviction and registration” test 
would provide a far more consistent outcome for disciplinary cases in which an 
attorney solicits a minor via the internet for sex. Based on the majority’s analysis, had 
an actual teenage girl been unlucky enough to have engaged in conversation with 
Lever instead of the detective, there is little doubt that he would have had sexual 
contact with her at the train station.82 how can actual sexual contact be the measure 
for determining an attorney’s fitness to practice and the court’s baseline for protecting 
the public from those unfit to practice? While all crimes by attorneys represent a 
violation of the public’s trust, it is difficult to imagine a crime more deserving of 
disbarment than the preying on minors for sex.
 new York courts have been willing to take the position that certain acts by 
attorneys should generally result in disbarment. the case law in new York related to 
sanctions for conversion of client funds is far more consistent than it is for attorneys 
who engage in sexual misconduct with minors. “it [is] well settled that, ‘absent 
extreme mitigating circumstances,’ attorneys who have intentionally converted client 
funds have committed serious professional misconduct, which warrants disbarment.”83 
While the courts have not provided a clear definition of “extreme,” they have stated 
that “financial pressure cannot constitute an excuse for misuse of client funds and a 
strong message to that effect is required to protect the public.”84 For example, in In re 
Birnbaum, the attorney did not cause any client to suffer a loss, nor did he take any 
funds that he was not ultimately due in fees—and yet neither of these facts, nor his 
“unblemished 30-year career,” protected him from disbarment.85 the First 
Department held that even though Birnbaum “immediately repaid the stolen funds 
to the penny before his clients requested the funds,” the fact remained that he 
“repeatedly used his clients’ escrow funds to subsidize his personal and business 
80. See Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d at 527. the court refers to the threshold standard that it applies as “actual 
sexual contact,” meaning that physical contact took place. See id. the true nature of the test is whether 
or not the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the minor. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 532.
83. In re Sheehan, 847 n.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (1st Dep’t 2007).
84. In re Birnbaum, 762 n.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1st Dep’t 2003).
85. Id. at 78.
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expenses and his ultimate repayment of the misappropriated funds [did] not excuse 
the wrongful conduct.”86 if any of Birnbaum’s clients had been harmed, he could 
have made them whole by repaying the funds; the same could not be said of the 
object of Lever’s “affection.”
 in cases of client fund conversion, the court requires “extremely unusual” 
mitigating factors to warrant a sanction less severe than disbarment.87 But in cases 
such as Lever, the standard is based on unqualified mitigating factors.88 Without a 
doubt, Lever had experienced a combination of serious personal issues prior to his 
crime,89 but is preying on teenage girls via the internet the natural response to such 
events, such that these events should excuse Lever’s behavior? Why is Lever more 
“fit to practice” than an attorney with thirty years of experience who moves money 
back and forth from a client escrow account without harming anyone? if one act 
warrants disbarment, why not the other? By not finding that conviction and 
registration as a sex offender is an absolute for disbarment, the Lever majority sent 
the message to the bar and the public that attorney misconduct related to fiduciary 
matters is a more reprehensible violation, warranting a more severe sanction, than 
sexual misconduct related to children.90
 the Lever majority erred by using an “actual sexual contact” test when determining 
the sanction for an attorney convicted of attempted sexual contact with a minor. the 
court reasoned that Childress and Engl were the most factually analogous cases to 
Lever, but in so doing ignored Lever’s factual similarities to Harlow.91 the court’s 
objective in disciplinary hearings is to determine the fitness of an individual to 
practice. Lever’s conviction and subsequent registration as a level-one sex offender 
clearly warranted the sanction of disbarment. an application of the Lever dissent’s 
reasoning—basing the sanction on the attorney’s actions, intent, and conviction—
86. Id.
87. Id. at 77.
88. In re Lever, 869 n.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (1st Dep’t 2008).
89. See id. at 531 (catterson, J., dissenting). the Lever majority considered several mitigating factors, 
specifically, that respondent was “under great stress from work and social and family relationships,” that 
he was “working 80-hour work weeks,” he had recently broken up “with his girlfriend of one year, [his] 
father [had been] diagnosed with cancer, and [his] grandfather [had committed] suicide the previous 
year.” Id.
90. See Childress II, 770 a.2d 685, 697 (md. 2001) (cathell, J., dissenting). in his dissent, Judge cathell 
concluded:
today the majority says that an adult sexual predator who has used the internet as a 
means to entice young females away from their homes and families to meet with him 
for sexual purposes, and has actually met with those young girls for sexual purposes, is, 
or may be after a period of suspension, fit to practice law and has not engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. the majority, given that the oft-stated 
primary function of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, in essence 
holds that it is more important to protect the general public in respect to their money 
matters, than in respect to their children.
 Id.
91. In re harlow, 720 n.Y.S.2d 645 (3d Dep’t 2001).
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would provide a clear test and therefore result in more consistent sanctions for 
attorneys convicted of such crimes and, ultimately, better protect the public from 
attorneys who are unfit to practice. Where an attorney preys on minors for sex, the 
sanction must be disbarment.
